Subcomittee Workshop on Soviet Military Economic Relations (1982)
First written on Instagram 2022-07-30
First posted 2022-10-27
TLDR and my thoughts:
In the 1980s it was clear that another Soviet military investment buildup was occurring. The question was how dangerous was this to NATO? Apart from all the technical issues, such as translating costs from Russian Ruble and pricing to American Dollar and pricing (IE Russian labor is cheaper, research cheaper, but production much less efficient, although can be done en masse), and the problem of Soviet budget and political secrecy, it was determined by the majority of the witnesses in Panel 2 that the Soviet economy could not indefinitely go on increasing its military investment. (Refer to third picture: Mr Bond accurately states the legitimacy of the regime depended on its ability to increase standard of living and reduce goods scarcity. This idea was widely believed in the public as a cornerstone of Soviet Socialist theory as to why it was better than Western Capitalism.)
So why were they continuing to spend more? Mr Rush argues that the spending was done in order to carry out global political objectives during the time that said investment gave the USSR the military edge vis a vis the USA (since the USA had not invested as much money in absolute terms in the same period). Furthermore, it was conjectured that Brezhnev was using the buildup as a way to gain political power and favor within the military establishment and high military defense council, which was apparently separate from the politburo. In fact, the high defense council was so important as a political institution, and had so much independence, that not even members of the poliburo had automatic access to its secret meetings and reports. You had to be in the council to get the reports.
[Indeed, we see the attempted use of this perceived temporary military advantage even in Russia’s actions today. Putin first announces numerous military reforms, upgrades, and new tech like tsunami nukes and hypersonic missiles. What does he do a few years later? Invade Ukraine. Only that his gamble totally failed.]
At the end of the hearings, Mr Simes and Selin both argue that even if the USA cannot effectively weaken USSR through sanctions, it is still imperative to not trust them. He says it is necessary to ramp up our own investing and training for defense. This way, not only can we strengthen security, but also force the USSR to continue to sustain an unsustainable level of military spending, or play nice. Thus, Kahn’s Type III deterrence plays out exactly as he predicted: the threat (and eventual actualization) of massively increased investment on the part of the USA is a form of coercion in and of itself, which can force the adversary to back down.