First draft posted: 2022-11-11

(This is my full first Github dedicated Book Review post! So far, all my other book review links have been copy pasted from my Instagram.)

Strategic Studies Institute: Editors Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, Jeffrey D. McCausland. US Army Wwar College. Government Publishing Office. April 2012.

Definitions

Tactical Nuclear Weapons, or TNWs, are nuclear weapons which, as defined by various treaties, are those that have a range of less than 500 KM and generally under a certain tonnage. Furthermore, TNWs are also defined by their main use cases: 1. To destroy enemy army units; 2. To destroy enemy army bases; 3. To destroy enemy logistics and transport; 4. To destroy enemy naval assets; 5. To destroy incoming enemy ballistic missiles. As you can see, these use cases are not the destruction of enemy civilians or industry: destruction of people is in the realm of strategic nuclear weapons.

However, as the book notes at various points, even a tactical weapon may have strategic effects, either militarily, or psychologically. For example, the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, though they were smaller than even the smallest tonnage TNWs today, had undeniable strategic effects on the psyche of the Japanese Empire. However, for the purposes of the book and my review, I will use TNWs as defined in the first paragraph.

Historical Context

The tactical nuclear weapon was developed as a way to save American lives by forcing a quick resolution to the Second World War, and also to create a bomb before the Axis or the Soviets could. Thus, from the very beginning, the bomb was a strategic weapon in the sense that it cemented the United States’ position as the paramount power after the Second World War.

Yet, despite this global superiority in the immediate aftermath of 1945, the United States and its Allies were locally outmatched in Central Europe by the large ground forces of the Soviet Union and its ‘allies’. Despite predictions by Allied high command that the Soviets would likely not be able to push the Allies all the way from the dividing line in split Germany all the way to the Channel, the predicted cost in defending West Germany and France was unacceptable. Furthermore, with Britain in debt, France and Germany in shambles, and the Allies reluctant to let Germany rebuild its military lest they turn to their old ways, the question was pressing: how to match the Soviets’ conventional military capability? The answer was TNWs.

Fast forward to the rise of the Wall (1961). At this point, the Soviet conventional military was overwhelming. Furthermore, given the political powderkeg that as West Berlin, it would be impossible to defend NATO territory without the use of TNWs. The dilenma: if the Soviets were to threaten West Berlin, would the Allies back down? Or would they fight? If they fought, there was no way they could hold West Berlin, as it was an island in the midst of East Germany. No amount of conventional forces could provide a credible deterrent: stationing them in West Berlin would simply lead to a blockade and supply choke, trying to rush forces to create a land bridge would be very difficult against overwhelming Russian infantry numbers. But it was also politically impossible to not defend West Berlin either. Thus, while West Berlin held little military or economic value, it’s political value was very high. It was the litmus test of resolve for NATO, especially the United States, in the defense of its Allies. Again, the solution to this problem was TNWs.

Not only were TNWs cheaper to build and maintain than conventional armies, but they were also provided huge firepower. Certainly, both Germanies and Poland did not like the fact that NATO had amassed large numbers of TNWs, as any war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would result in an “irradiated Germany and Poland”. But the TNW was here to stay. I personally believe that the implicit understanding between the USA and USSR during this era, up until the dissolution of the USSR, was that TNWs were ‘fair’ for NATO to employ en masse simply because they could not hold against the USSR’s conventional military (especially after the United States’ further involvement in Vietnam, and subsequent military shrinking).

However, everything changed with the rise of Gorbachev, the fall of the USSR, and the expansion of NATO. Now, although Russia’s military capacity is still quite powerful, it is in fact unable to pose a major invasive threat to NATO. Thus, the implicit agreement has changed: Russia has stockpiled a large number of TNWs, while American TNWs have decreased to only 100 in Europe. (France and UK have no TNWs). What are some implications of this current path? What are the reasons for certain nations’ actions? We will start from this jumping off point.

American Perspective

The most important actor, the United States, is the backbone of the free world. Athough it has become popular to accuse the United States of neo-imperialism, oilgarchy, invading helpless states, forcing people to adopt its culture and ‘world order’, it is still the fact that without the United States’ involvement in World War II, China would likely be half-enslaved by Japan, Continental Europe would be completley Soviet, and the UK would still control the majority of their colonies. The backbone of the backbone is provided by the USA’s nuclear arsenal. Although American conventional capability is unmatched in the world, it simply cannot keep up with all the various potential adversaries that are popping up in the world. Furthermore, the power of a large number of advanced nuclear weapons is such that they allow the United States to coerce without fighting.

Thus, despite calls from various factions within the United States to decrease its nuclear arsenal, the military has consistenly and staunchly advocated for the continued maintenance of America’s nuclear capability: for they understand that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, the United States must be a nuclear power.

However, despite these facts, the United States is reluctant to use nuclear weapons. This, I think, stems from its ultimate moral character, as compared to say, the Soviet Union. I think the reason why the Soviet Union did not use nuclear weapons was because it did not believe it could win in a nuclear war with NATO, not because it had any respect for human life.

Thus, a fine line exsists: a large number of advanced nuclear weapons is necessary to deter enemies, but at the same time, the US has been very reluctant to threaten their use, let alone use them. Of course, this is a good thing, but as many peace activists will say in turn: ‘if we don’t use them why have them’? Of course, it is hard to prove something’s utility when it’s purpose is that it’s exsistence is to deter its own use.

However, the peace, or at least, anti-nuclear activists have grown especially vocal in Europe. In various countries, factions have consistently advocated and called for the removal of TNWs from European soil. This movement towards de-nuclearization, coupled with greatly declining military spending on the part of NATO members which are not the USA, has put the alliance in disharmony. The United States consistently spends 4% of its GDP, whereas the combined average spending of all the other members of NATO amount to only 1.5%. This is much lower than the agreed 2% minimum.

Rightly so, then, the United States strongly wishes to continue to station TNWs in Europe (even if it is only 100 gravity bombs), especially if the lazy and idealistic Europeans are unwilling to spend more money. Or, on the other hand of the spectrum, ‘why should we (the United States) continue to defend Europe if Europeans are unwilling to pay the political and economic costs of at the very least sharing the same percentage of burden as we are for their own defense’? Certainly, the Americans are right, but I also think the US’ threat to leave Europe to its own devices is not very credible. First off, such a retraction would be very damaging to US prestiege. Secondly, the EU is still a major trading and cultural partner of the US.

Thus, for the forseeable future, the United States has to still provide the majority of the defense for NATO, while at the same time suffering massive domestic disconnect and lack of investment in its own people. As long as Europe continues to outsource its defense, the United States will continue to destabilize. Although American absolute power has in fact increased over the world since 1991, its relative power has greatly declined vis a vis increases in the cost of living, increases in the demands of citizens for a good life, increase in the power of China, increases in terrorist activity, and increase of problem states like North Korea, Iran, Syria, and so on.

Furthermore, with the rising antagonism from Russia and China, the willingness of all sides to slowly disarm and become more transparent has dissappeared since the days of Gorbachev. Thus, TNWs, even if they do not play a major role in the military doctrine of the defense of NATO, still play a major psychological role in demonstrating American commitment to Europe. Indeed, many Eastern European NATO states see it this way.

The United States also wishes to station TNWs in Europe due to its proximity to the Middle East. If certain actors their should get way out of hand, the United States would be able to threaten nuclear weapons quickly, especially from its airbases in Turkey.

European Perspectives

Germany

Most prominent of these European perspectives is Germany. Especially since the fall of the USSR, the idea has been that TNWs are pointless because ‘Russia does not have the capability to invade Europe, nor does it show signs of wanting to,’ at least, according to Germany. Germany, I believe, also wants to get rid of TNWs because they remind them of their own past brutalities. Germany believes that it can simply use soft power to create friends and allies, but as the recent decades have shown, economic development and connection do not always result in democratization or the creation of trusting relationships. In fact, a relationship without oversight generally does not develop into a good one. Thus, my theory that a hegemon is required to create stable relationships (since the security and arbitration is outsourced to the hegemon) is proven again. Whereas France and Germany were not able to reconcilate after WW1, they were clearly able to after WW2, with the creation of the EEC under the aegis of the Marshall Plan and the American military/nuclear umbrella. Germany’s anti TNW stance is also a result of its anti nuclear power stance. Again, people have fallen prey to thinking of different matters in large blocs unilaterally. This is another demonstration of people’s inability to separate things and hold two seemingly opposing stances at the same time.

Germany also is fundamentally wrong one strategic point: namely that Russia will always be friendly and continue to deliver energy resources. As we are seeing, this has had drastic consequences on the European security situation.

France / Poland / Baltics

Out of all the EU powers, France is polar opposite of Germany. Athough France has no TNWs, it is vehmently opposed to the withdrawl of American TNWs from NATO, and will accept no input from other allies on its own strategic arsenal. France, especially since DeGaulle, has grown wary of Anglo-Saxon perfidy, and while willing to cooperate with the UK and USA, is not willing to be subsumed into their military command structure. Thus, while the United States may be willing to remove TNWs from Europe as a method of appeasing some EU allies or as a way to get Russia to reduce its stockpile, France is the last backstop and will probably never agree to this. This is because even though France’s own nuclear command is independent, it sees any further removal of the few American TNWs left in Europe as potentially creating the grounds for a mass EU movement to restrict its own strategic arsenal. In other words, any agreement to the removal of American TNWs will likely undermine France’s position as an independent nuclear power. Furthermore, France, like Poland and the Baltics, sees the US TNW deployment in Europe as a signal of its firm commitment to the alliance. As history has shown, it was these countries, but especially Poland, which took the vast majority of the damage in both World Wars.

The Baltics are also especially concerned about American commitment, because even if NATO as a whole can hold on against a Russian invasion, a localized Russian attack on the Baltics would be difficult to hold off, given the Baltics’ exposed position. (Now it is not so exposed with the coming addition of Sweden and Finland, but it is still vulnerable).

The UK

The United Kingdom is ambivalent. It has no desire to decrease its strategic arsenal, but nor is it showing any signs of modernizing it or increasing quantity. Rather, it is continuing to rely on American style SLBMs to load its submarine tubes. The United Kingdom, despite having left the EU, is willing to consider the reduction or removal of TNWs from Europe, if it means increasing the cohesion of NATO as a whole. The UK’s threat perception, although more accurate than Germany (it certainly recognizes Russia as a threat), is still not as urgent as that of Poland/Baltics (adversary: Russia), or Turkey (adversary: certain Middle Eastern actors and terrorist groups, and to a lesser extent Russia).

The UK’s main problem, as is the problem with most of the overspending Western Democratic nations, is its deficit. It is likely that the UK will continue to maintain its arsenal while not upgrading it. Unless the UK can solve its deficit issue soon, their arsenal will quickly become outdated, and they will simply become an extension of the American arsenal.

Comments on NATO and the EU

NATO can never reach its true combat potential because its exsistence is based off of the agreement of various independent states, some of which are not very Democratic. The original use case for NATO was to defend against potential Soviet attack. Though that use case waned from 1990, it has now come back with a vengeance. Ironic. However, the other use case for NATO is to prevent a mass wave of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa from reaching its borders. The reason for this is that NATO’s borders are in fact quite porous, and cannot easily be defended by police units themselves. Furthermore, the increasing economic inequality, deficit, and energy instability is already causing a lot of problems. The immigration crises in 2014-2016 and even now, can only add more problems to the EU’s integrity. In this sense, NATO should act as a police on top of the police. Furthermore, given certain Middle Eastern states’ wish to acquire nuclear weapons, NATO must be unified to defend against any potential missile attack on its lands.

Of course, this second use case is not often talked about, as the liberal leaders of the majority of Europe are unwilling to face facts and say things that sound in any way Nazi-like. However, unless NATO steps up to secure its borders, it will definitley not only lead to a social collapse, but also a unity collapse among NATO-EU nations, who are dealing more and more with refugees who do not integrate, and refugees who burden the national psyche.

However, despite these two problems, NATO is entirely capable of holding off a Russian attack ALONE without North American assisstance. Again, like the refugee issue, the question is will.

Asian Perspectives

Nuclear weapons in Asia have in some ways been made simple by the fact that the war against Japan was mostly won by the United States. I am not discounting China’s massive sacrifice (20 million dead) and effort in holding off the Japanese, but it’s clear that the Chinese could have never ‘won’ the war (in the sense of making Japan kneel), only stalemate the Japanese into deadly attrition on the Chinese mainland. Thus, the United States had massive leverage to basically do whatever it wanted with Japan, and later, Taiwan. Due to the absence of threats in the area, the Americans decided not to station any nuclear weapons anywhere on foreign territory. This too, was partly for the sensibilities of the newly created Democratic Japanese nation, which, along with the US, has a very unique relationship with nuclear weapons.

This simple status quo, combined with the region’s wish to increase standards of living, allowed for a unilateral approach to nuclear armarments and decision making. (From a more cynical viewpoint, it could be said that the Americans did not trust the Yellow race, the Japanese, to make their own decisions, and did not think them advanced enough to have independence of action and opinion. This difference is clear when one examines American attitudes to West Germany, where the US did give more consideration to their concerns.) Furthermore, there really was no need for TNWs in the area, as the American Navy for the longest time was completley unchallenged.

Now it is different. China has an estimated 400 strategic warheads, 100 of which are capable of reaching the American Midwest. Pakistan and India stare at each other with their nukes, ready to strike at any provocation. North Korea has a few, but functional nuclear missiles which can strike the entirety of the Pacific rim. Despite the fact that any conventional blue water confrontation would still likely end in a clear victory for the US, it is not clear whether American Allies would survive unscathed, and it is also not clear if a conventional coastal confrontation would result in American victory. Furthermore, it is clear that a nuclear confrontation at sea would mean the complete anhilation of an American carrier battlefleet. Though this last possibility is unlikey, as any such action would likely result in massive American nuclear retaliation in turn.

In terms of absolute superiority of nuclear weapons, America still has enough to completley anhilate potential adversaries in Asia. However, this is not the problem. The problem, if we are to use Kahn’s methodology, is that of deterring smaller localized actions. This is where TNWs come in. Since conventional capability is no longer sufficient to deter costal actions by potential adversaries, TNWs are looked upon as the tool to close that gap. Case in point: more and more Japanese are considering having American TNW sharing on the home islands. (This outlook is much akin to the outlook vis a vis early NATO and the USSR.) BUT, any attempt to station them on any of the East Asian islands would likely result in a big reaction from other actors. Furthermore, there are numerous green and peace factions in Japan that do not want them stationed there, due to fear of escalation, or just general dislike of nuclear weapons.

The situation in Asia is definitley now much more multipolar than the situation in Europe. This difficulty will only get worse as the United States’ defense obligations stretches it thinner and thinner, and as potential advesaries get stronger and stronger. The law of diminishing returns applies here. One of the major reasons there was general peace between big nations for the past 80 years was because after the second world war, everyone had destroyed each other, with the exception of the totally intact industrial, academic, cultural, agricultural, and populatoin base of the United States. Thus, it was easy for the US to patrol most of the world. Now, with most countries having rebuilt and risen, it is no longer the case that the United States can exert unilateral pressure over the seas.

Russian Perspectives

As the successor state of the USSR, Russia still imagines itself to be a major world power. Certainly some aspects say this is so. It has the most nuclear weapons of any country in the world, it has the world’s largest land mass, it has an incredible amount of natural resources, and its population is large. However, this is all illusory. And Russian planners and academics know this.

The majority of Russia’s population is concentrated in the West, facing Europe. Although NATO (from a Western viewpoint) does not want to invade Russia, Russia does not see it in this way. The current leadership under Putin sees the collapse of the USSR as secretly induced by NATO, with the incompetence (or at worst, collaboration) from the ‘fool’ Gorbachev. Despite the population size, it is still not enough, nor suitable in terms of age, to mount a defense against a full fledged NATO invasion. This fact the West still has yet to understand: Russia is fundamentally an insecure nation: its borders are impossible to defend. I am not trying to excuse Russia’s behavior in Georgia or now in Ukraine, but I am simply saying that we’ve had 30 years to work out some arrangement but have not.

Thus Russia is now in the position of the weaker hand: it must use TNWs to guarantee its own military predominance in localized battles. We do not know precisely what Russian doctrine is concerning the use of TNWs, but it is likley that they will be used in the event of an invasion into the heartland of Russia. I think despite all the war mongering, the Russians don’t want to immediatley escalate into a full strategic nuclear war, so their targets for TNWs will mostly be military in nature.

The other often unspoken problem for Russia is its long border with China. Although the West tends to see these two countries as allies, they are anything but. Rather, they are allies in the sense of Three Kingdoms: that is, allies only out of convienence, not really out of love or trust or mutual understanding. In the East, Russia’s population is barely anything. It certainly cannot hold off against a Chinese invasion to take the rich lands of Eastern Siberia. Therefore, the ONLY defense possible is one involving the use of TNWs. However, one must still keep in mind that Russia has no desire to destroy China, as destroying China would even further reduce the pressure on the United States. It is estimated that more than 50% of Russian TNWs are stationed east of the Urals. At the same time, Russia’s claim to the Far East, especially East of Lake Baikal, is tenuous at best. The region is sparsely populated, and much of the land is used by natives, who often look more asian than Russian. This is indeed the area in which Russia and China meet and mingle, and I predict will become the future contention point, as China tries to find more living space for its people and more resources. Mongolia, unfortunatley, will be caught in the middle, as it already is.

Middle Eastern Situation

The Middle East is a mess of anarchy and authoritarianism. Iran is capable and willing to obtain nuclear weapons, but Western sanctions have crushed it so badly it is also willing to negotiate. Certain other states such as Syria and Iraq have been suspected of harboring nuclear intentions, certainly they have had chemical weapons before. Saudi is likely heading towards the development of nukes, as its relationship with the United States deteroriates further and further. I think it is best for the United States to continue to sanction these nations as much as possible, in order to deter the proliferation of nukes. However, sanctions do not work when one is dependent on some of these nations for a vital resource: oil. Unless the United States is able to greatly lessen its dependence on oil, it will have to at least leave one of these nations unsanctioned in order to continue buying from them. As it turns out, this nation is still Saudi Arabia.

The anarchy in the Middle East cannot simply be attributed to the colonial legacy however. Its current problem are in fact largely a result of the incredible greed and incompetence of its ruling elites, from Egypt to Syria to Lebanon to Jordan to Iran and so on. This problem will not get fixed, and the failure of the Color Revolutions has only led to further fear and oppression from the rulers, and further disillusionment and despair from the people. Western intervention cannot do anything, as we do not have the will (we never had the will lol), and I think nor the capacity, to actually change things. Thus, the best thing we can do is try to prevent countries in the region from obtaining nuclear weapons.

Israel

Israel is the unique case in the Middle East because it is a non Arab state which is beset on all sides by hostile actors of varying degrees. In fact, most of its immediate neighbors do not even recognize its exsistence. Israel likely has nuclear weapons, but has not openly said so. I estimate around 100-200 warheads. Due to Israel’s advanced military, it probably has multiple delivery mechanisms, which ensures the aresnal’s survival from a conventional first strike.

In an ironic twist, Saudi likely depends on Israel for the nuclear umbrella, since Saudi and Israel, though not allies, and though professed religious advesaries, both share a deeper mistrust and hatred for Iran.

Israel also likely will stick to a doctrine of ‘strategic defense, operational offense’ with its TNWs. Although it has zero love for its Arab neighbors, it also does not wish to brutally erase millions of civilians from existence. Israel is thus stuck in a hard position: if ever push comes to shove, and it is forced to use its nukes, it will NEVER be forgiven, and I think international assisstance will not be forthcoming. Clearly, Israel has done wrong in the region with its illegal settlements, but at the same time, Europe and the Middle East has done wrong to Israel for two millenia. Such a cultural animosity between Israel and its Arab neighbors will likely last for many more decades. Ironically, Israel’s best major ally in an emergency situation may turn out to be Russia, as both are surrounded by dangers, and both are outmatched in absolute terms (if their enemies were to combine), but overmatched in local terms (if Israel or Russia were to strike first, although we are seeing that this may not even be true anymore with Russia’s crap performance in Ukraine).

Cooperation

Cooperation is not likely unless there is common understanding on other fronts: Trust is built upon many small actions of reciprocation. This is a topic for another essay.

Reflections on Human Nature and Technology

The atomic genie is out of the bottle. One cannot put it back in. We live with the convienences of the modern age, and its evils. This is what it is. As long as there is no unified world state, it must and should be the case that the United States maintains a robust, diverse, and plentiful nuclear arsenal. Speak softly and carry a big stick. (I will probably also write more about this later.)