First written: 2020 July 4-30.

This essay is based off multiple books about Bismarck, which I read in the summer of 2020.

Part I

Thoughts on Otto von Bismarck.

Central question: can we blame Bismarck for WW1 and WW2?

The first thing we have to ask before we answer this question is what would have happened if Bismarck never was. (IE, we assume an alternate history after 1848. I choose 1848 because Bismarck does not have a high position yet, and this is the year of the Revolutions across Europe that fail).

Would the German states have unified regardeless? Would Austria have still maintained its empire? Would the other states, especially France and Russia, have acted differently? From what I have read (and I am by no means super familiar with 1815-1890), I am not sure if a total unified Germany would have at all appeared. It is likely that a Unified Germany consisting ONLY of the Northern German states would have arisen, due to numerous factors. As for the Southern German states, I am not sure. Especially given that Austria even at 1815, at the height of its political prestiege (with Metternich’s conducting of the peace of Vienna, and the creation of the “Concert of Europe) was in economic shambles.

However, this much is clear: the North Germans, including all the way from East Prussia to the Rhineland, had a clear connection. Religiously, they were Lutheran, and economically, despite the vast difference between Prussian peasant based economies and Rhineish industrial revolution, they traded with each other a lot more than they did with Austria. Why? For many reasons.

First off, after the explosion of trade over the Atlantic (due to the rise of America), The German states had suffered a big stagnation in international trade in the 1700s. Because of this stagnation, they started to trade more with each other. Austria, however, was not as impacted, because of its geographic nearness to the East (IE Russia), its geographic isolation from the rest of the German Confederation [Austria is interesting in that it’s borders from the rest of the German Confederation are dotted with numerous high mountain peaks, these being essentially the eastern tail of the Swiss alps], and because of its own internal market: the various ethnicities and imperial lands of the Austrian Empire.

[The Southern German states, then, are the interesting ones, since they were both close to Austria and close to the North German states. In reality, however, the South German states tended to not want to get involved, being firecly proud of their own independence in all matters, to the detriment of cooperation even amongst themselves (these states being Baden, Wuttemberg, Bavaria). Furthremore, the South German states generally like to cooperate with France, France being a Catholic country, and because of their more-than-friendly relations during the Napoleonic era, where the Southern states benefited while being client states of the French Empire.]

Back to the hypothetical:
It is possible that if Bismarck did not appear, Northern Germany might have unified into some sort of entity. Most likely this entity would have taken an economic form, due to the fact that North Germany’s network of natural rivers and man-made canals provide a very convienent North-South AND East-West transport system. However, even this scenario of mine runs into trouble.

Why? Because, as is shown in the ACTUAL history of Germany, the various states of North AND South Germany all highly value their independence, and generally speaking voted liberally against the Conservative Monarchic impulses of Prussia. Especially after the year 1848, the various monarchies of Europe, especially those of Austria and Prussia, had to institute various Constitutional Guarantees and other reforms. Thus, would Prussia have allowed North-German unification at the exepense of its own monarchy and conservative values? Furthermore, would Austria have allowed it? It is important to remember that despite its rotten interior political, social, and economic situation, Austria still possessed the facade of a Great Power and still had a sizeable army (even if it was pretty bad for a Great Power). Thus, it is very difficult to assess what William I, his cabinet, and the parliament would have done if Bismarck never exsisted. Most likely, even if William I allowed for calls for a parliamentary North German bloc, Austria would have found some way to stop it, either by direct intervention or calling in French or British aid. Thus, if Bismarck never exsisted, it might be the case that the German states continued on in their little confusing-border-lines fashion, even to this day. It was Bismarcks will and cunning that created unified Germany.

As one good video on youtube put it: Europe was delicate balance of powers, and at its center, were a bunch of German states in a balance of powers. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ME_tV4849NQ)

BISMARCK AS A PERSON:
It is difficult to discern what Bismarck really wanted in his position as leader of Germany for 30+ years. At first it seemed like he simply wanted a return to conservative enlightened absolutism. But it is clear in his various writings that he did not like total absolutism. Nor did he like parliamentarism. In fact, after reading all about him, I get the feeling that he just wanted to rule everything himself, and have everyone agree with him. Bismarck was probably the closest anyone in the modern era got to being King without actually being King.

Bismarck, despite his temper and his crazy and intense speeches, was not actually a physically violent man. He often cried, made pleas to the King William I, multiple times threatened to resign in a rain of tears and an outburst of anger, and one time even threatened to jump out of a window, all because the King and the ministers wouldn’t do what he said. Furthermore, despite his contemporary image of “Iron and Blood”, in reality, he was a man who was deeply civilian in nature. Having only served in the reserves for one year, his image in his later years of a man always in military uniform covers the fact that he ALWAYS had other options ready before he resorted to force. In fact, in his Iron and Blood speech he didn’t actually threaten the use of force, but rather, that the use of force was one of the possibilities he was prepared for in order to get what he wanted.

But what did Bismarck really want? I am inclined to think that at the very beginning, he wanted to quell the Liberals and put an end to the constitutional deadlock, where the liberal majority would not approve an extension of the military bill, and the King and his ministers kept pushing for the bill. Ultimatley, after 4+ years of deadlock, what solved the issue was not an internal agreement, but rather, Bismarck’s eventual use of German Nationalism against Austrian arrogance to solidify his and William I’s prestiege: the fact that Austria would not cede in any matters relating to Prussian control North of the Main river provided a nice pretext for the buildup of greivances and hostilities between Prussia and Austria. German nationalism only soared even more when Prussia and Austria “half annexed” Schewlsig-Holstein from Denmark. And later when Austria refused to give Prussia full control (despite Austria having literally no land border with the peninsula), a quick victory over them by the Prussian military only caused nationalism to soar even higher.

Bismarck was thus correct when he realized that Nationalism need not be a Liberal idea.

IMPORTANT NOTE:

(We take Nationalism as inherently tied to Conservatism. This was not the case. Nationalism in the olden days was opposed to monarchism. IE, one is rule by people nationale, the other is rule by King with divine right. We might credit Bismarck with tearing Nationalism away from Liberalism and tying it to Conservatism).

Thus, through this war, Bismarck managed to tear one pillar of the Liberal majority out from under them: especially since he used unconstitutional means to achieve German nationalism (IE, he funded the military without budget approval, and he mobilized without approval as well). Thus, already we can see some strains concerning the fact that Bismarck was very apt to use un-constitutional means to achieve his objectives. From the start, he stifled anti-conservative newspapers, he jailed people with prison sentences (usually 6 months) to stop them from attacking the King, he continued military spending without the military bill actually being ratified, and he mobilized the Prussian army without consent of the Parliament. HOWEVER. It must be noted that these were his MEANS, not his ENDS. Again, the question becomes, whad did Bismarck really wasnt? What were his ends?

After Prussia crushing victory over Austria in 1866, Bismarck did something almost no other statesman would have done: he left the defeated opponent, Austria, alone. He took not a single inch of Austrian soil. Against the inclinations of the entire cabinet, the military staff, and King William I, Bismarck forced his will through and stopped the follow-through invasion of Austria that was planned so eagerly by the High Command. Why did he do this? Because in reality, the foreign war with Austria was not so much a move in international politics, but rather a timely and convienent way to CEMENT CONSERVATIVE MONARCHIC, AND PRUSSIAN POWER BACK IN NORTHERN GERMANY. Thus, in reality, he was not fighting to destroy Austria, but 1. to force Austria to recognize Prussia’s supremacy north of the Main River, and 2. to foster German Nationalist sentiment at home, thus leading to the crumbling of the Liberal majority in Parliament.

But how did Bismarck manage to do this? In fact, it was only because of Bismarck’s incredible skill at playing one side off another side that he managed to pull this off. This is one example of his GENIUS level statesmanship and political/diplomatic intrigue. In any other timeline of history without a Bismarck, most likely France would have interevened in the conflict to prevent Prussia from attacking Austria. But Bismarck avoided this (and other eventualities) by doing what he did best: he took the position of the pivot, he took the fulcrum. He prevented France’s entry into the Prussian Austrian War by playing on Napoleon III’s fear of an Prussian-Austrian reconciliation, while he tried to squeeze as many concessions out of Vienna as possible by playing on Franz Josef’s fear of a Prussian-Franco alliance. Only until the fact that Austria got tired of conceding to Prussia, and had actually mobilized its army, did Bismarck slowly head towards the use of the Prussian army, but even then, he conducted secret negotiations with Vienna in order to avert war.

Bismarck’s inclination to only make the vital decision at the very last possible moment is a reoccuring theme in his life. It was not because he was afraid of making the decision, but rather, that he wanted to be sure that it was the “most useful decision with the least harm possible” that he could make. Furthermore, especially in the case of war, Bismarck did not like to make decision until the last moment because war “can never be controlled”, whereas political intrigue and fear-mongering CAN be controlled and manipulated (however, this is to finally prove wrong when he meets the stubborness of William II).

After the Seven Weeks war and the consequent unification of North Germany into the North German Confederation, Bismarck quickly switched tacts. Instead of being a staunch Prussian conservative, he became a German Nationalist, and started proposing liberal ideas, such as welfare. This is extremely important because it shows that Bismarck doesn’t really care about any principle, except the principle of the aggrandizement of the state. Once Prussia had accomplished its role as the unifier of North Germany, Bismarck instantly turns his focus to North Germany as whole, instead of only particularly focusing on the prestiege and power of Prussia.

One could also say that the only thing he cares about is power, which is also true. His own power, to say the least.

I notice that this is getting a bit long, so I’m going to shorten the rest of the history post 1866-1890 up a bit. Basically, some machinations induce a war between France and Prussia, and Prussia goes to war with France, but this time, Bismarck can’t stop the Generals from fully invading france, so now he is stuck in a year long siege of Paris, because the French aren’t giving up. So contrary to the claim that the war with France was used to unify the Southern German states, in fact, it was the unification of the Southern German states with the North Confederation that allowed for the prolongation and prosecution of the war with France. LOL. But in any case, the war shows that the South German states had to choose a side: and they chose North Germany instead of France or Austria.

In any case: after that, Bismarck basically settled into a position of not wanting to risk the new Germany. He didn’t want anymore wars, or anymore entanglements. He saw that he had unified and conquered as much as he could morally defend, (basically he unified German lands, with the exception of Metz, which he added in a fit of anger in the treaty with Paris after the Franco-Prussian war, an addition that was to cause him and Germany much pain later).

However, his very inflamation of German nationalism would haunt germany later: for the new generation of Germans, including William II, wanted prestiege, they wanted global empire, they wanted economic prosperity, they wanted a navy big enough to rival England’s. Instead of the pursuit of the possible, instead of reasons of state, these new leaders had reasons of principle: Power, Glory, Wealth: most importantly (and most disastoursly), all to be achieved outside of exsisting German lands. Thus, Bismarck’s unification of the Reich inadventendly gave William II and his military advisors the tool needed to exert German Domination.

LET US RECAP: Bismarck did everything FOR THE STATE. He was not interested in principles. His goals were these as follows, and in this historical order. The preservation of Prussian military power and monarchy. The establishement of Prussian supremacy in North Germany and the creation of the North German Confederation. The Preservation of the confederation. Then the semi-unwanted war with France and the subsequent Formation of the German Reich (in fact the second one in Germany’s millenia long history). The preservation of the German Reich.

So was Bismarck just a unprincipled crazy man? Power hungry? Everything for the State? Perhaps. But what one forgets is that even the state itself, or power, is a principle. Although people praise Bismarck for being innovative and a practitioner of real politik (or accuse him of it): isn’t this what european monarchs have been doing for centuries? All of them, despite being kings, fight and kill each other, all for power, land, glory. The whole reason I still don’t clearly understand the 1800s is simply because the whole mess of alliances and possible alliances and blocs of alliances and this and that is just so confusing and makes no sense. Why does it make no sense? Because all of these alliances are based on expediencies and power, not only any true principle like democracy, like we western countries practise today (although even the “demoracy principle” is shaky and questionable if we are to look at the actions of some “democratic” countries). This is why reading about Bismarck is so confusing. At any time in the historical narrative, he has multiple motives, multiple methods, multiple endgame scenarios planned out. And to a lesser extent, all the other countries do the same. You never know completely what’s going on.

In reality, Bismarck didn’t do anything new, he just took it to the next level. Instead of letting any sort of sentiment cloud him or block his judgement, like the lust for conquest and glory that plagued the German generals from the Seven Weeks War to Operation Barbarossa, Bismarck knew how to wait, he knew how to manipulate, he knew when to start, and MOST IMPORTANTLY, HE KNEW WHEN TO STOP. Bismarck upheld the PRINCIPLE OF POWER to its purist and utmost form, with no blemishes. It was his perogative to do anything to aggrandize the state as much as possible, and preserve it, without risking German lives. In this sense, Bismarck was one of the greatest statesman in all time. Under no other leader has a country grown so fast in land and economic power, and done so relatively bloodlessly.

(In my opinion, Hitler could have very well stopped after taking over Czeoslovakia, but he decided to take one step further and conquer Poland. If he had stopped after taking over the Bohemian lands, he would have very well once more formed a New German Reich equal, if not greater, in prestiege, power, and prosperity to Bismarck’s Reich.)

So can we blame Bismarck for what happened after he died? The popular metaphore is that Bismarck created a state that resembeled a souped-up-race car, one that only he knew how to drive without crashing. But this is unfair. Why should we blame him for the creation of a car like this? Couldn’t the next driver of the car driven slowly? (Or, are we to blame the gun on the table for the murder of an innocent?) The counterargument would be then: well if you put a fast car in a excitable man’s hands like those of William II’s, there is bound to be a high-speed accident. (Or, if you give the police a hammer they will see every problem as a nail.) Still then the counterargument to that would be: well, why not blame other nations, like Russia or Austria, both of which are monarchies and both of which also have large resources at their disposal?

Ultimatley, however, it is perhaps true that the VERY formation of Bismarck’s German Reich allowed for the conditions of WWI. Otherwise, what reasons would Russia and France have for fighting again? Like the fun youtube video I linked said: Europe was a delicate balance of powers, and at its center, was delicate a balance of powers. It is precisely because Prussia rose to become the Great Power of Germany that completley altered this delicate balance of powers. In this sense, YES, we can indeed blame Bismarck for the consequent WW1, and maybe even WW2. But this is an unfair placement of blame. If that is the case, we could also blame the Meiji Restoration for the Pacific war, a restoration that was in fact one of democratic values, openess, western economic advacement, and western social norms! Or we can blame the British for trying to maintain their empire and not allowing Germany to try and get some. And so on.

In fact, Pre Facist Japan in the 1920s heavily resemebled that of Weimar Germany, if not more so, in its freedom of speech and tolerance of new ideas. It was only because of the military’s resentment at being sidelined, that led to their coup d’etat over the democratic establishement in Japan. And much like in Germany, none of the democratic Japanese statesment thought to control the military establishement. (We might also then blame Einstein for the Cold War!)

Similary, this is what happened in Germany. Although Bismarck thought of the army only as a tool to his State ends, Bismarck failed to take into account the long lasting effects of raising the army to such a prestigious and powerful role in German society. He also failed to see that the army leaders would have thoughts and values of their own, quite distinct from Parliamentary Germany. This is what would throw William II into war, and what would consequently choke the development of Weimar Democracy for its entire 20 year lifespan, due to the fact that no matter what, the spectre of the Army loomed behind the Weimar Parliament, ready for any excuse of revolutionary activity to pounce.

Thus, I would say that it is not so much the unification of Germany that was the issue, but rather the lasting implications that Bismarck left behind during his unification of Germany. Like I said, he used the army to coerce, he silenced enemy papers, he locked people up with (admittedly) light jail times for opposition, he decieved and promised people on both sides at the same time, he wrote the German constitution mostly by himself and left many loopholes in its conduct, thus allowing for a single man to take the position of fulcrum, independent of Judicial, Parliament, and Monarchic branches.

Furthermore, we must not forget that Germany’s political, national, and economic-industrial development all occured in the quick span of 1815-1900, whereas England, France, Russia, Austria, all had hundreds of years to consolidate their lands, develop their political institutions, and then move forward to industrial revolution. For Germany, all this happened in less than 100 years. So in fact, now that I have said all this, perhaps Bismarck IS to blame. Indeed, no one could have been so astute and delicate as he in the dangerous game of international and domestic politics. But was there a need for someone as astute as him? (Just like a trust that is given to a heir, the only thing the heir needs to do is not waste the money away, and it will slowly grow and become self-sufficient.) But perhaps the race car analogy is correct. Bismarck, the 6 foot tall fat man, was the only ballerina delicate enough to dance the line between so many conflicting powers and interests. It was obvious that William II had neither the patience nor the insight to do what Bismarck did.

But if we are to indeed blame Bismarck for WWI, then can we not blame the founding fathers for the rise of the Confederacy, and till even today, for White nationalism and Trump? If we are to blame the founders of a system or nation, then the Founding Fathers of this country are equally guilty, for not seeing how truly and deeply stupid and uneducated the masses really are, despite already taking that into account for the creation of our American democratic system.

For better or for worse, the modern nation has to be one of the NATIONAL premise, in order to effectively compete and prosper in this international world. Bismarck saw that in the 1850s, and he knew he had to act in order to preserve Prussia, and consequently, Germany’s independence, security, and propserity. In fact, he willingly made Germany off of the core of Prussia, instead of vice versa, and later emphasized GERMAN unity over Prussian power. The fact that subsequent statesmen were completely idiotic and inadequate cannot be blamed on him, for he tried his best to create a starting ground for the German Empire which would be prosperous and powerful. Perhaps the New German Empire wanted too much, things that were impossible. But this then goes into the reasons for WWI. And there are many reasons for WWI, not just on Germany’s side. But that is an entirely separate spiel that I can write if you want me to.

One can only imagine what would have happened if Germany remained a bunch of small ass states. Most likely, there would have been no WWI. Russia would still be a Tsarist country today, and Austria would still be a giant empire. The Ottoman empire would probably have disintegrated naturally, as it was on the path to doing so, and Greece would have formed as an independent Nation. . The UK would still maintain most of its colonies, and Germany would still be a relative backwater in Europe. The United States would remain in isolation, ever wary of European motives and extravagence. Essentially, the United Kingdom would still be the forestmost Super Power (if you can call it that) in the world, and we would have the continuance of the world balance of power as it had been since after 1815 (defeat of Napoleon) and 1848 (European revolutions put down). Indeed, as I understood the European situation, even before I read about Bismarck: the story of 1848-1945 is simply Germany’s challenge to the British World Order (or Anglo-American). It is the century of German rise and power. And despite the fact that the UK managed to defeat Germany in the end, the UK too, had exhausted itself in crushing the continental threat. Now, 1945 and onwards, it was time for a new world order, a new empire. And despite the USSR’s challenge to that empire, it came out on top and still strong. Though now with China, Iran, and Russia back at its doorstep, and idiots inside causing a mess, I wonder how its preeminent position in the world will hold up.

Let’s see how long the American World Order will last.

PART II

Thoughts on Bismarck Part II July 30 2020.

After reading the Edgar Feuchtwanger book about Bismarck I have now a more defined view of Bismarck I think. First, that it is necessary to say that Bismark’s achievement in unifying Germany during his great period of 1860-1871 is something truly remarkable, and if it were not for said unification it is highly likely that Germany today would be two states: 1. North Germany, 2. Greater Bavaria (IE South Germany), split along the river Main. This would be due to the reasons I have discussed before: IE, Southern particularism, Catholicism, agriculturalism, and inherent dislike of Northern (especially Prussian) domination.

We may excuse Bismarck for his inherently undemocratic and unconstitutional actions during this period of 1860-1871, for it is the case that every founding of a nation is beset by moral problems upon which we now look with embarassement, shame, or disgust. So it is the case with Bismarck’s unification of Kleindeutschland (IE Little Germany: a Germany that does not include Austria, as opposed to Grossdeutschland, most famously realized by Hitler). Although during this period Bismarck employed many evil tactics, such as the threat of military action on social democrats, jailing opposition journalists, loud propoganda efforts, and efforts to split the opposition parties, we must also remember that he did not start any of these tactics: in fact they were in use before he came into power. Prussian militarism, censorship of the press, monarchical confrontation, were all tools of the long standing Hohenzollern Dynasty in Prussia. However, Bismarck CAN be blamed for aggravating the use of these tactics, for making it more widespread, for pushing it to the limit with his brinksmanship, for being confrontational and lying about his actions afterwards, or using the excuse that “he did it to surpress the danger that parliamentarism brings and its consequent revolutionary tendancies”. But even then, it is true that many other nations in their founding have done similar things.

Thus, it is not so much the era of 1860-1871 in which I find Bismarck evil and distasteful, but the period after 1871, in his long rule (comprising 2/3 of his time in office actually) over the Unified German Empire. After the unification of Germany, Bismarck has already achieved the seemingly unachieveable. At this point, Germany is very well set for the future: with a strong military, large population, a growing industrial-economic base, and political prestiege internationally (if not even evny and resentment). Yet despite these facts, Bismarck firmly clings to power and tries to surrppress the Social Democratic and parlimentary movement. Why does he continue to do these anti-socialist measures? It is hard to say. Whether or not Bismarck thinks democratic tendancies and socialism truly is bad is up for debate: but the fact remains that all his actions point towards the shoring up of his own position and power at the expense of other parties, most especially the Social Democrats. Indeed: the fact that he passed the health and age insurance laws does not necessarily mean that he truly thought these laws were a good thing: rather, it is more proveable that he thought by passing these laws he could get votes that would form a continued base of support for him.

Indeed, Bismarck never commits himself to one party, and he always tries to keep his own position. Riding off the wave of his amazing success in unification, Bismarck adopted the persona of the “State above politics” who is willing to do anything for the nation. (Obviously this tactic is often used by dictators and demagogues, just look at Trump). But in reality, what is the state IF NOT politics itself? People who claim to be neutral in politics deserve the lowest rung in hell. And indeed we see that Bismarck is VERY political. But not in the traditional conservative or liberal sense that we think today. Rather, he is political in always maintaing his own position. (Although it is true that he consistently tends to lean right rather than left).

One might say that Bismarck did these morally grey actions out of necessity, since he knew he was the only man who could maintain the system of delicate balance, of trust and fear, of alliance and counter alliance in Europe, of sitting on the fence between all nations. But this itself raises the question: if Bismarck knew how hard it was to play this international game, and that he had no good successors, why did he continue to play it? Obviously he knows he can’t live forever. Why didn’t he either simply declare German neutrality, or declare firmly for one side? The fact that Bismarck did not prepare anyone to be his successor, or did not set up the parliament so that it would be strong enough to combat William II’s arrogant and rash behavior is still a mystery to me. Was it really that he was so afraid of democracy and the spectre of European revolution that he did not, to his closing days in his position as chancellor, open up the forum to unhindered democratic discourse?

To the very end, he rode upon a semi-dictator system that he created and never once wanted to get off: though he was moderate in his war and unification aims in 1871, it is blatantly clear that he was never moderate in his sheer hunger for political power and personal political freedom: the freedom to do what HE wants, the freedom to tell everyone else to get in line. Although one might argue that this sort of action was most common to the monarchies of europe, it must be remembered that Bismarck presided over his semi-dictatorship during a period of national growth and the gradual beginning of a national German popular consciousness. The fact that the very first government this German consciousness grew up with was the semi-dictatorship of Bismarck must obviously have heavily tainted its political development and consciouesness. Perhaps the best thing Bismarck could have done to ensure the peaceful transfer of power and the continued functioning of politics was to either prepare a skilled succesor, or establish greater parliamentary powers, and then simply retire.

There are other things which Bismarck failed to address. Most noticeably: he did not realize the power of the rising industrial-urban proletariat, which quickly became a class of its own after the Unification of Germany. He also failed to realize that although the National German sentiment may be used to create Germany, he and future leaders might lose control of it after Germany had become established and grew proud and confident of its own abilities, thereafter forcing its will upon stupid, arrogant, egotistic, and easily swayed autocrats like William II. Public opinion was not simply a tool anymore, it would later become an end of its own, and to disasterous effect. If you pull a plant to make it grow “taller”, you kill its roots. In this sense Bismarck did the same: he built Germany so quickly and brilliantly that he did not notice that its political foundation was made of hay. It looks sturdy at first, but at the first strong wind the whole thing topples down.

Thus, I now revise my previous assessment, and I think that the saying that “Bismarck created a high power racing car that only he knew how to drive” is in fact quite accurate. But there is one question: if indeed Bismarck did somehow have a Chancellor-successor that was as skilled as he, could that new Chancellor have managed to deal with the growing national consciousness, sentiment and pride that Bismarck created in his Unification? We must remember that Bismarck was only able to get to his position of near-dictator because the time was right: the Kaiser William I was weak, the failed revolutions of 1848 had just happened, Germany was fragmented, Austria was overstretched, France was viewed with Suspicion. Thus it can be observed with great astonishment: that Bismarck not only occupied the position of the fulcrum in the world of domestic parliament vs monarch politics, in the world of foreign nation vs nation politics, but also in the historical timeline of the transition from Cabinet era diplomacy (Metternich Style) to National-popular diplomacy (Louis Napoleon [newphew of Napoleon I] Style). Bismarck used the people’s popular sentiment to create Unified Germany, but did not consequently give it the freedom and rights that should consequently follow (as happened in England and the United States).

THE CONTRADICTION: he created a National-Popular state, but ran it with a Cabinet-Ministry government.

Now one might argue that Bismarck thought the new country was not yet ready to become a more open democracy: that much like a bird who is learning to use its wings, if you let it go it might think too highly of itself and flap away and fall to the ground. But the fact remains that if Bismarck really thought the new country not ready: why did he not prepare the grounds, why did he not train the new government to fly on its own wings, without the help of papa Bisarck? It seems that ultimatley, Bismarck simply just did not like parliamentary democracy, and also he was just really power hungry. Time and again he said that the “British parliamentary system was not for Prussia/Germany”. From statements like these it becomes clear that what he has in mind for Germany is a dictator state with the nice-looking cloak of the Reichstag. But who is to be the dictator? Bismarck only.

We will never know what might have happened if Bismarck did step off the helm after the Unification of Germany in 1871. Perhaps socialist sentiment would have risen to such a degree as to scare the neighbor countries and cause some sort of “revolution repression” war. Though this seems unlikely: since France was already a national-populist state, and Austria had barely the funds and organization to defeat a unified Kleindeutschland. It is likely that if Bismarck had created a stronger constitutional and parliamentary framework, there would have been no WWI, given the fact that perhaps parliament would have been able to control William II and also resist the pressure of the German populace who wanted to go to war over their international prestiege. But again, this is debateable and unknown.

The concrete fact remains that Bismarck’s 28 years (in office) of secret and often shady dealings in both domestic and foreign affairs created a lasting legacy that the common citizen of Germany should simply let the “grown ups” do the hard work. As Feuchtwanger puts it: “Germany was always looking for a savior, especially after they had experienced Bismarck’s miraculous unification of Germany and his “above the politics” manner”. As we subsequently see in German history up to 1945, the German people are always thinking of the “good old days” and looking for a savior to lift them out of their international shame (most especially over the WWI war guilt clause).

Yet despite the people’s admiration for Bismarck they eventually felt that the country was stagnating under his policy: for he would not give up power and he would not allow for stronger parliament, nor would he allow for rapid colonial expansion or wars with Russia and France (things which the populace desired). It is thus highly ironic that the very national sentiment that Bismarck used to unify German and cement his position as Chancellor ended up kicking him out of office, as symbolized by the new emperor William II. For William II was a vain and easily hurt man, with a half-disabled left arm and parents who didn’t really like him, he was always looking for attention and validation. And what better place for an emperor to look for love and support and power than from his very own people? And what better act to gain the love of the people than to kick out a grumpy old minister who is overstaying his tenure in office, even if he is the unifier of Germany?

Even in retirement Bismarck couldn’t stop doing politics. He would constantly write articles for journals, in which he blasted the current state of affairs. He would always spurn William II in formal events, or simply not even go when invited. Now that he was kicked out of power by William II, he wrote that the “Reichstag needed to harbor a constant majority with which it is thereby enabled to criticize, control and warn the government”. Indeed, this sudden about-face from his previous statements about the very dangers of parliamentary government shows that he really doesn’t care: he just wants to be the one in charge. Everything is a means to him: the only ends are himself and the peace of Germany. But it is also true that he was right: a strong Reichstag was necessary to control William II, but it never materialized: thanks in large part to Bismarcks’ own 28 years of surrpressing it.

Thus, Bismarck had created a semi-dictatorial institution that functioned specifically on the fulcrum position the Chancellor held. But it is often forgotten that although the Chancellor held great power, he also was held in account for his actions: and could not simply do anything he wanted (since he was not emperor himself). For although Bismarck threatened the dissolution of the Reichstag many times, he knew that it was very dangerous to actually carry out such a threat: it would most likely risk civil war. Furthermore, he was still held marginally accountable to both emperor and parliament, despite often manipulating them. Thus it is interesting to imagine what Bismarck would have been like if he was NOT inhibited as Chancellor, for example, if he was actually emperor himself. Indeed, as history shows: the subsequent de-facto ruler of Germany, William II, had no such restraints: for he WAS the emperor. But then again, William II was also very arrogant, rash, and stupid.

Perhaps if Bismarck had retired in 1871 and convicned the militaristic and conservative William I to let parliament take over, there might have been a healing of internal wounds in Germany. Maybe the southern states would have really come into the fold, instead of the Kulturkampf that followed 1871 all the way to Bismarck’s fall. Perhaps Catholics would have learned to get along with protestants, industrialists with farmers, rich with the newly working poor, and so on. It is thus sad to see the maxim true: if you want to unite a people: go to war. Bismarck unified Germany economically, geographically, and militarily through the Austro-Prussian war and the Franco-Prussian war. And one might say that William II unified Germany culturally and politically through various acts of bravado, such as in grabbing colonies, cutting ties with the “Russian Slav race”, building a big fleet to rival Britain’s (which it never could rival Britain’s), and finally, in starting WWI. For indeed, there was never such a fervor as when war was declared in August of 1914. Never was there such a feeling of national, specifically GERMAN, unity and purpose. The time had come to defeat the decadent French, the scheming British, the slavish Russian, the insurgent Polish, who had all detested and envied German unification and power. What the world would have become if Imperial Germany had won, one can only imagine.

The Big Picture across the Atlantic.

Despite all these devlopments in Germany and on continental Europe, one must not think that WWI was the point when “Western History” (if there is even such a term) stepped into “Modernity” (if even such a term means anything). Indeed, the situation in Germany was merely a sideshow in the grand spectacle of Western History. For during the Unification of German from 1860-1871, there was an even greater event taking place across the Atlantic. From 1861-1865 there was a brutal civil war in the United States of America, where an internal kulturkampf of even greater proportions played out with the deaths of about 750,000 soldiers, 80,000 slaves, 50,000 civilians, and the total destruction of large swaths of the Southern states. For this was a war in which men fought not because they were greedy for more land, or more prestiege, or more power, or more resources, but rather, because they thought that each other’s way of life to be INHERENTLY incompatiable with their own, and fought to the DEATH over it. (It can even be distinguished from Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, since that was was one of political reasons: Napoleon wished to make Russia follow its political ends, that of adhereing to the Continental System of Embargo against Britain, whereas Russia wished to retain its independence of conduct and sovereignty.) In this light, the German wars of Unification are small and political matters in comparison to the all-out life and death struggle between the Union and the Confederacy.

Indeed, it is this AMERICAN war that, I think, is the step into modernity. For in it you see (for the first time in many instances) that railroads are used as weapons, that trenches become commonplace, that aimed rifle fire becomes standard infantry procedure, that fortified civilian centers and their consequent bombardment become commonplace, that the entire nation becomes a resource to be used in the defeat of the enemy, that there unconditional surrender is the only option, that scorched Earth is a viable offensive strategy, that ways of life that are at war, that the entire population is at war.

The impresiveness of the German achievement.

Again, when one looks at the bigger picture one realizes the smallness of the German achievement. Little Germany rose and fell within a span of 47 years (1871-1918). Weimar lasted 15 years (1918-1933). Nazi Germany lasted 12 years (1933-1945). Whereas America is still here. But perhaps it is precisely because of Germany’s smallness that its achievements are still something so dazzling today. Despite being a tiny little nation, Prussia managed to defeat Austria. Despite being a fragmented coalition, North Germany and its Southern allies managed to defeat France. Despite having to carry its weak-ass neighbor Austria, Imperial Germany managed to kick Russia out of WWI and almost killed France. And 20 years later, even after disarmarment and a decade of economic failure, Germany in its Nazi form STILL managed to nearly take over all of Europe. Even today, despite partition and the numerous economic and social mechanisms created by the allies to keep Germany economically reliant on its neighbors, it is yet again, the most powerful country in Europe: with the most advanced weapons, the biggest industry, the most developed economy, and the most exports: surpassed only by China and the United States. Indeed, I think it is this consistent underdog status and meteoric rise of Germany that keeps historians and civilians alike fascinated with its history, culture, and legacy (for good and bad), and politicians fearful of its explosive potential. Only time will tell what the future holds for Germany on the world stage. Will it continue to be an abiding member of the EU, competing economically and trying to save its pathetic allies (most especially Greece)? Or will it take the lead once more and form a Pan-European state, capable of filling the void of American leadership, capable of competing with China, capable of standing up to Russian encroachment? All I know is this: that as much as I desire peace and prosperity, it is the sad and shameful fact for a historian that it is usually trying and turbulent times that make for the best reading.